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IAccording to an anecdote, Thales is said to have predicted an eclipse of sun,
which really happened on May 28th, 585 B. C.;2) and he is said also to be the first
measurer of the height of pyramids in Egypt.3) On the other hand, Socrates in
Plato’s Dialogue Meno, being urged by Meno to substantiate his claim that the
learning is nothing other than the recollection (	), tries to illustrate the
case by showing how an uneducated slave boy can recollect truths and solve a
geometrical problem, without teaching except for a series of questions.
Thus, both of these thinkers, at intervals of 200 years, gazed respectively at
their geometrical figures on the sand, in order to solve the problems with which
they confronted. Although the problems with which two distinguished thinkers
confronted were different from one another, their ways of thinking were essen-
tially isomorphic. The way of thinking they held in common might be regarded
as a version of the Best explanation or as a kind of “abduction” which C. A.
Peirce originally advocated.
Now, let me begin with Thales’ case. At 352, 1318 in his Commentary on the
First Book of Euclid’s Elements, Proclus referred to the proposition 26 of the First
book4) and gave an interesting comment : ‘This contribution to the precise under-
standing of the present matter comes from Porphyry ; but Eudemus in his history
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of geometry attributes the theorem itself to Thales, saying that the method by
which he is reported to have determined the distance of ships at sea shows that
he must have used it.’5)
By the way, T. L. Heath,6) mentioning to Proclus’ sayings about the matter, ex-
amined various scholars’ conjectures including Bretschneider’s, Cantor’s, etc.,
and evaluated Tannery’s7) was on the right road and said as follows : ‘To find the
distance from a point A to an inaccessible point B. From A measure along a
straight line at right angles to AB a length AC and bisect it at D. From C draw
CE at right angles to CA on the side of it remote from B, and let E be the point
on it which is in a straight line with B and D. Then, by I. 26, CE is obviously
equal to AB.’ (Figure 1)
Only one flaw Heath detected in Tannery’s solution was that it would require
certain extent of level ground for the construction and measurements. Thus,
Heath himself suggested another solution which relies on the supposition of a
tower on the top of which Thales could to use ‘a rough instrument made of
straight stick and a cross-piece fastened to it so as to be able to turn about the
fastening so that it could form any angle with the stick and would remain where
it was put.’ The gist of his suggestion is so obvious that I think I have no need
referring to his detailed explanation, except for the proviso purporting to convey
Diogenes Laertius’ saying about Thales’ method of measuring the height of the
pyramids that Thales waited for this purpose until the moment when ‘our shad-
ows are of the same length as ourselves.’8)
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What, then, epistemological attitude can we discern in Thales’ practical and
empirical achievements such as the prediction of eclipse, the measurement of
distance of ships at sea, and the calculation of the height of the pyramids, etc.?
I think we can ascertain the following epistemological principle which regulates
Thales’ scientific investigation (P):
P. The nature of a directly inaccessible object becomes indirectly knowable,
only when a projective isomorphism as a mean between the object in ques-
tion and a directly accessible9) object can be detected.
Ascertaining a fact that “a projective isomorphism as a mean” in question is an
indirectly grasped intelligible truth which itself cannot be perceptible, let me call
P “the principle of isomorphic projection.” Then, it is a notable fact that the prin-
ciple does not only underlie, in almost universal way, Presocratic philosophers’
way of thinking, but also underlies even the Platonic philosophy, of course with
certain significant provisos.10) Namely, on a broad survey, Presocratic philosophy
and Platonic philosophy may, in their fundamental structure, be characterized as
holding in common an isomorphic structure.
By the way, a methodological aspect of the P may be regarded as “the rule of
the Best explanation,” logical structure of which may be formulated as follows :
‘ifholds and ifis the Best explanation whyholds, thenmust be true.’ The
formula is, of course, from the truth-functional viewpoint, not a tautology.
However, from the heuristic point of view, it is useful to detect an unknown truth
which is directly inaccessible. The pattern of this logic should be legitimately re-
garded as a version of the ‘abduction,’ which C. S. Peirce formulated.11) As
Sebeok said, it is the logic of a detective.12)
Now, let me return to that sandy place, where Thales’ working figure was wit-
nessed. Drawing two similar triangles on the sands and calculating the height of
the pyramid Thales discerned a projective relation between pyramid’s long
shadow and his own short one. Working like this, however, other Presocratics
and their successors too, gazed at the various shadows as the projective “signs,”
which enabled them to penetrate into the structure of the whole environment
and to speculate the origin of the world-order.13) Thus, the shadow on which
Thales gazed was a pass, by the medium of which one can penetrate into the
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nature of real world. It was a kind of projective “sign” employed in projection-
geometry to grasp the identity of the real world. Indeed, the European way of
philosophizing initially came into existence by means of gazing upon shadows.
Moreover, the scientific representation of the world-order itself originated in the
deliberate observation (˜) of shadows. They observed carefully various
shadows ; the shadow projected on the ground by ‘gnomon,’14) the marks left on
the mud by retreating sea offshore15) and the shaking waves on which a sailing
boat floats.16) They heard also attentively the wind breathing through high in the
sky which can be perceived on the rustling platan’s top17) as well as the rhythmic
sound of the hammer resounding on the anvil.18) The theory () of the
world-order (	
), the cosmology, made its appearance more and more
through their careful reading of the shadows as the《signs》sent from the real-
ity.
II
Thus, the Greek thought originated from the observation of shadows. Men-
tioning to Thales as a paradigmatic figure of the European thought, Michel
Serres says :19)
The sandy place, on which the sun marks itself, is equal to the underground
Caves’ wall, whereon the different shadows are projected. For the sake of
European intellect, indeed, this has been a thousand-year-long stage of rep-
resentation and an immutable form, which was historically the same as a
gaze upon the pyramid in question.
In the beginning, it seems, though naive as it was, Greek thought was rooted
firmly in a sound and secure soil. In due time, however, a bold metaphysical
speculation of the natural environment and human-beings began, so that a unfa-
thomable distance, a bottomless chasm between gazing eyes and discerned ob-
jects, between the reason and the reasoned, began to open at the same time.
Fully awaking its own power to penetrate into the reality itself, human reason
comes to organize itself as a system of pure light, and to locate itself in the
position of the sun,20) which reigns over the whole world. Thus the practical
or empirical “organs” to decode the shadows was to give place to the “logoi,”
国際文化論集 №29
― ―142
with which one should take refuge in order to get around the “absurd”21) diffi-
culties caused by the “physical (sense-appealing investigation” (	

)22) and by means of which one should investigate the truth of things.23)
Thus the logos-oriented metaphysics24) made its appearance25) and was giving a
revised version of the original P, which was to enable one to offer the Best expla-
nation in its proper sense.26) Socrates’ mention to the “	˜	” at Phaedo
99d100a might be construed as referring to such a Declaration of Independence
from the conventional fetters of “physical investigation.”
However, the first and prominent indications of such a logos-oriented meta-
physics makes its appearance in the Meno, where Socrates endeavors to solve
the so-called Meno’s paradox which may be formulated into a constructive di-
lemma:27)
1. For any x, one either knows, or does not know, x.
2. If one knows x, one cannot inquire into x.
3. If one does not know x, one cannot inquire into x.
4. Therefore, whether or not one knows x, one cannot inquire into x.
Confronting with this dilemma Socrates takes refuge in a hearsay that the
human soul is immortal and ‘has been born many times and seen both what is
here and what in Hades, and everything, there is nothing it has not learnt.’ Thus
he insists that ‘no wonder it’s possible that it should recollect both virtue and
other things, as after all it did know them previously. For seeing that the whole
of nature is akin and the soul has learnt everything, there is nothing to prevent
someone who recollect-which people call learning-just one thing, from discover-
ing everything else, if he’s courageous and doesn’t give up searching ;－ for
searching and learning are just recollection’ (81ad).
The theory of recollection on the one hand entails the immortality of soul and
on the other hand presupposes the eternal truths which the theory of Forms en-
sures. In this way, a full metaphysics based on the parousia of Forms made its
appearance which was, according to A. N. Whitehead,28) the strongest and great-
est in the European tradition of philosophy. Thus being a value-dimension inter-
polated, the former tripartite and horizontal scheme of :
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(a) The measurer Thales,
(b) The shadow of Pyramid, and
(c) The sun who mediates them
had to be transformed into a novel, vertical and teleological one. Then, the physi-
cal world including the (physical) sun itself too, had to become a product (
) and an image (	
) of a transcendental sun-like reason (˜). Thus, as
a result of such a turn of events, the shadow of the sensible thing too was to be
transformed into a ‘shadow of shadow.’
Needless to say, the circumstances we are witnessing are an epoch-making
axis-transformation of Greek thought, which was mainly caused by Plato’s bold
metaphysical thinking. The transformation in question, indeed, began with
Plato’s strong sense of disappointment with the contemporary physical way of in-
vestigation as exemplified by Anaxagorean physical investigation, which accord-
ing to the Socrates in Plato’s dialogue Phaedo neglected to examine what is the
best and the most excellent for every thing, which should be the true cause of
the everything.29) Plato rejected this type of investigation flatly and was replacing
it with his own.30)
However, the original had not been scrapped but incorporated into Plato’s
theory of Forms, which exhibits a peak in the simile of the Divided Line. The cir-
cumstances are rather complicated. To explicate the matter as simple as possi-
ble, let me designate afresh the oldas,31) and the new one as, which Plato
called “a sort of wild jumble of a method of my own.”
The problems to be answered are the followings : What sections in the Divided
Line does each of them ( and ) manage? How far is each one’s effective
range? Which part in the Divided Line can we correspond to each of these prin-
ciples? Where is the essential difference between these principles,and, and
what does it mean in the contexts of Plato’s philosophy?
Now, in order to answer these questions, let me draw a skeletal structure of
Divided Line :32)
The relationship between two line segments of  and is one of
“
” (visible) and the “” (the intelligible＝invisible). Then, they are
subdivided in the same ratio between “
” and “” into two unequal
sub-sections. So, is subdivided into and  33); and in the same ratio
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also is subdivided into  and respectively (Figure 2). Thus, the
proportional relationship between them becomes to be expressible as follows :
II (1) :＝:＝: .
And therefore it is also that
II (2) ＝.
The gist of the simile of Divided Line34) does mean nothing other than this,
provided that the subscript “1” and “0” signify the properties “” and
“” with their whole Platonic implications like “reality,” “truth,” “clear-
ness,” “obscurity” and so on.35)
The above proportional formula (1) represents the skeletal structure of entire
Platonic universe, laying aside the question of the Good itself. The domain of
 represents the “” and its upper subsection is the proper
domain of Forms36) and the lower subsection is, according to Aristotle,37) the
proper domain of the so-called “intermediates,” i. e. the mathematical beings. On
the other hand, the domain of  represents the “” and its upper
subsection is the proper domain of the sensible things like ‘the animals
about us and all plants and the whole class of objects made by man’38) and the
lower subsection  is the proper domain of the shadows of the sensible
things. It is notable that the components of the subsection  are nothing
other than “the shadow of shadow,”39) because the whole visible domain (
 ) is a shadow of the invisibles ( ) so that the term “shadow” in its
primary sense does, in the context of Plato’s metaphysical thought, refer to noth-
ing other than the shadow ( ) of the sensible things (), which are in
turn shadows of the invisible things ( ).40)
Thus, the shadows on which Thales gazed became to be identified with “the
shadows of the invisible things.” But, which subsection of the invisible do they
have a reference to? If it is the case that they should have a reference to the
subsection , whose components may be the so-called “mathematical beings”
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or the “intermediates,” regardless of Aristotle’s authority there would be differ-
ent objections, since most of the Plato scholars are recently inclined to disap-
prove “the intermediates” between Forms and the sensible things.41) Thus even
Guthrie persisted in : ‘It is “very unlikely” that Plato had formulated a doctrine
of mathematical objects as intermediate between Forms and sensibles !’42)
III
However, then, what is the more “likely” story? What is the objective compo-
nents of the sub-section ? If it is not the case that the “” has its own
proper objects which should clearly be distinguished from the Forms as well as
the sensible things43) and if it is not the case that the objects of the “”
were actually regarded as the intermediate between them, where then is raison
of the “” which is to be clearly distinguished from both of “	
”
(or “	”44) and “	
” in the framework of the “Divided Line”?
I believe the above questions are legitimate, since they conform to Plato’s
principle. At Republic V. 477c, Socrates refers to the cognitive faculties
(
) () by virtue of which we are able to do what we are able to do and
says : ‘In the case of a faculty I look to one thing only that to which it is related
and what it effects, and it is in this way that I come to call each one of them a
faculty, and that which is related to the same thing and accomplishes the same
thing I call the same faculty, and that another I call other.’45) In conformity with
this general principle Socrates there confirms that “” is different from
“	” so that it is necessary that each of them is a different faculty which
has to be related to a different object, and concludes that the 	()
is to be related to that which is, i. e. the knowable object and the ( )
is to be related to that which both is and is not, i. e. the opinable one.46)
Unless Plato had forgotten this principle completely and had another concep-
tion of the cognitive faculties when he had an idea of the Divided Line and set
about subdividing afresh the original Line of two parts (and  ),47) I be-
lieve, Plato should have abided by the principle. Thus, when in conformity with
Socrates’ guidance we had a descending sequence of the four faculties in the
soul, i. e. 	
	
and 	, we were to discern the same pro-
portion exemplified in a duplicated form in the sequence, which was previously
represented as a proportional formula of “	＝is : both is and is
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not.” Then we could define the as a cognitive faculty which is related to
the object which both is and is not within the domain of the intelligible. Pay at-
tention to a fact that the definition is aptly fit for Glaucon’ rehearsing words at
Republic 511d : ‘And I think you [Socrates] call the mental habit of geometers
[...] “” and not “˜” because you regard “as something inter-
mediate” (	
) betweenand˜.’ Thus, our “” is one domain
which corresponds to “the object which is” (O) and the “ ” is another do-
main which corresponds to “the object which both is and is not” (O ).
Thus, in accordance with the same proportional logic, we must say that the
“” is the first sub-domain which corresponds to “the object which is that
which is” (O), the “ ” is the second sub-domain which corresponds to
“the object which is that which both is and is not” (O ), the “” is the
third sub-domain which corresponds to “the object which both is and is not that
which is” (O), and the “ ” is the fourth sub-domain which corresponds
to “the object which both is and is not that which is and is not” (O ).
In brief, there are two sequences, one of which shows a descending order of
four objects (O) and another of which shows a descending order of four faculties
() in the soul : (), ( ), (), and 

( ):
What is then the real condition of the component in the second sub-domain,
which was in a riddling way defined as “the object which is that which both is and
is not” (O )? Let me try for a while to make clearer the implications of
Plato’s notoriously ambiguous expressions in the “Divided Line.”
At Republic 510bc, Socrates proceeds to subdivide the intelligible section
() and says as follows :
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I. There is one section ( ) where the soul is compelled to investigate by
treating as images (	
) the things imitated (O) in the
former division, and by means of hypotheses () from which it
proceeds not up to the first principle (
	) but down to a conclusion
().
II. There is another section () where the soul advances from its hypo-
theses to the first principle that transcends hypothesis (
	),
and where it makes no use of the images employed by the other section, re-
lying on Forms only and progressing systematically through Forms.48)
The above I is related to the homeland of “,” i. e. the proper domain of
the mathematical discipline ( ). On the other hand, the above II is related to
the homeland of “” or “,” i. e. the proper domain of the philo-
sophical dialectic ().
It is a noteworthy fact that both disciplines start with hypothesizing. However,
their ways of dealing with hypotheses are entirely different from one another.
Treating their hypotheses not as beginnings but as really hypotheses like steps
and springboards, the dialecticians proceed from these up to the first principle
that transcends hypothesis (
	), and once having grasped it, pro-
ceed downwards to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any sensible ob-
ject through Forms to Forms and ending with Forms.49) On the other hand,
making use of the images derived from the domain of the visible, the mathema-
ticians hypothesize ‘the odd and the even and the various figures and three kinds
of angles and other things’ and regarding them ‘as known () and taking
for granted that ‘they are obvious to everybody (
˜)’ proceed
from these hypotheses not up to the first principle but down to conclusion.’50)
The above circumstances are closely bound with each discipline’s way of deal-
ing with the visible objects. The mathematicians make use of visible things,
while the dialecticians make no use whatever of any sensible object. What does
it mean? Does it mean that two disciplines are completely cut off from one an-
other? But, we have ascertained that there is a common factor between them;
to start with hypothesizing, though they do in a diametrically opposite way. For
the dialectician, a hypothesis means nothing other than something like “steps
and springboards” just as for the mathematician a visible image of circle on the
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sand was only a clue to think the circle itself. Namely, for the dialectician a hy-
pothesis is analogically equivalent to a visible image for the mathematician. The
cardinal point to see is that Plato’s insight into the relation between the image
and the original underlies the above mentioned context. A. Wedberg says : ‘As
the sensible world is an image of the ideal, so does the domain of mathematics
consist of images of Ideas studied by Dialectic and so are the shadows etc. im-
ages of solid sensible objects.’51)
The mathematical objects are the image of the Forms investigated by the
dialecticians, so are the hypotheses too. Thus, instead of a visible image the dia-
lecticians make use the hypotheses, which in turn the mathematicians regard as
self-evident and take for granted that ‘they are obvious to everybody (	

˜).’ Seeking the Forms and the Good itself which can be grasped only by
the power of itself,52) the dialecticians substitute the visible images by the
hypotheses which the mathematicians regard as self-evident truths. On the
other hand, being compelled to use “,”53) the mathematicians make use of
the visible images to investigate their proper objects, though they are not think-
ing of the visible images themselves but ‘of those things of which they are a like-
ness. They pursue their inquiry for the sake of the square itself and the diagonal
itself, and not for the sake of the images () of it which they draw.’54) What
the mathematicians are seeking and grasping is nothing other than what can be
seen only by “the mind.”55)
There is no hindrance here to adhere to my interpretation of “Divided Line,”
which Gail Fine may regard as a typical mistake for the so-called “objects ana-
lysis.” G. Fine said :
‘L3 [note : it corresponds to our  ] poses a threat for the objects analy-
sis. For Plato makes it plain that the square itself etc. can be known in both
an L3 [our ] and an L4 [our] type way (511d); contrary to the ob-
jects analysis, then, the same objects appear at two distinct stages of the
line. Moreover, L3 [our  ] uses sensibles as images of Forms : but
sensibles are also in some way correlated with L2. So just as mathematical
entities appear at both L3 [our  ] and L4 [our ], so sensibles ap-
pear at both L2 [our ] and L3 [our  ];56)’
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First, it is a mistake to say that ‘the square itself etc. can be known in both an
L3 [our ] and an L4 [our] type way (511d).’ At 511d Plato never says
anything which may endorse such an assertion. There is no mention to “the
square itself” which according to Fine can be known in both ways of L3 and L4.
On the contrary, Plato at 511d insists that those who are compelled to use their
“” do not possess true intelligence about them (˜	


).57) The case can be made more clearly consulting with 533bc where
Socrates says to Glaucon as follows :
Geometry and the studies that accompany it－are, as we see, dreaming
about being (



), but the clear waking vision of it is im-
possible for them as long as they leave the hypotheses which they employ
undisturbed and cannot give any account of them. For where the starting-
point is something that the reasoner does not know, and the conclusion and
all that intervenes is a tissue of things not really known, what possibility is
there that assent in such cases can ever be converted into true knowledge
() or science?
The mathematicians are dreaming about being (

) which corresponds to O
. But, they do not grasp and know it in reality.
Second, therefore, it is also a mistake to insist that ‘the same objects appear
at two distinct stages of the line.’ The true beings like “the square itself” and
“the diagonal itself” in the domain of L3 [our  ] are nothing other than the
objects of dreaming. They are not yet “the objects of clear waking vision.” What
the mathematicians really possess there are just “intermediates” (O ) be-
tween Forms (O) and the sensibles (O).
Then, third, it is also a mistake to argue that ‘L3 [our ] uses sensibles as
images of Forms : but sensibles are also in some way correlated with L2.’ It is a
kind of sophistry to argue that ‘sensibles are also in some way correlated with
L2,’ since L2 (our ) is the proper domain of the sensibles. On the other
hand, the sensibles (O) are not’s proper objects. Making use of the
sensibles the is not thinking of the visible images themselves, but ‘of
those things of which they are a likeness.’ As long as she cannot proceed up to
the first principle and to grasp it, the remains to be as it is at her proper
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domain as an “intermediate” between the higher and the lower domains, touch-
ing in an inessential way to both domains.
Therefore, fourth, it is also a mistake to insist that ‘just as mathematical enti-
ties appear at both L3 [our ] and L4 [our], so sensibles appear at both
L2 [our ] and L3 [our  ].’ Concerning the second half I exposed its
falsehood sufficiently. But, the first half also is false, because the term “mathe-
matical entities” is too vague in order to express the real situation in the simile
of the “Divided Line.” Concerning the geometrical Forms like the Circle itself
and the Diagonal itself, they are the Forms qua Forms which should not be differ-
entiated from the other kind of Forms. Plato nowhere shows any tendency to
rate mathematical Forms inferior to other Forms.58) On the other hand, it is ob-
vious that mathematical disciplines have their proper objects which differ from
the Forms as well as the sensible objects. At Theaetetus 198a Socrates refers to
the art of arithmetic (	
) which is―provably conformity with the
contemporary practice―defined as a science of all odd and even numbers and the
counting process. Then, Socrates says that counting is the same as considering
how great any number in question is.59) What does it mean? I believe that Wed-
berg’s interpretation is acceptable. He says :
When we count, e. g., three objects, A, B, C, we point first at A and say
“one,” then at B and say “two,” then at C and say “three,” and finally con-
clude that they are three, i. e. we create a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the objects and an initial segment of the series of positive integers :
Apparently, Socrates thinks that the arithmetician proceeds in the same
manner when he calculates how much 5＋7 is. If we do not now misunder-
stand Socrates’ words, it seems that he thinks of 5＋7 as a set of entities
with which we may correlate one-to-one to an initial segment of the series
of positive integers. Since 5＋7 is 5 in the abstract plus 7 in abstract, it must
be a set of ideal abstract entities. But to be sets of ideal entities, viz. of units
or 1’s, is a characteristic property of the Mathematical Numbers.’60)
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It is obvious that the mathematical numbers as a set of units which are the
proper objects of the arithmetician and which can be found out only in the domain
of L3 [our  ] are fundamentally different from the Ideal numbers by which
one can neither count anything nor do sums in very simple addition, e. g.
5＋7＝12. Therefore, Fine’s statement ‘just as mathematical entities appear at
both L3 and L4’ is not true.
IV
Thus, according to Plato, the domain of should, not only from the meth-
odological or epistemological viewpoint but also from the ontological one, be
clearly distinguished from those of “	
” (or “	”) and “.” For
the , as Socrates at Republic VI. 511d says, should be regarded as ‘some
thing intermediate (
)’ between opinion and reason.61) Then, its ob-
jects too must occupy an intermediate position between the Forms and the sen-
sible things. The objects of mathematical discipline are, so to speak, in a position
of a mean proportional between Forms and the opinable things. The significance
of the matter will become more explicit, if we take careful consideration into
Socrates’ words at Republic 523d.
Referring to the dialectic, only by the medium of which one can advance up to
the first principle itself (), Socrates there defines the mathemati-
cal disciplines as “the assistant arts” (	) or “assistants in converting
others” () and gives an additional remark purporting that what ‘we
have often called sciences (	
) through force of habit’ really ‘need some
other designation connoting more clearness than opinion () and more ob-
scurity than science (	).’ At 534a, then, Socrates deals with his task of
reformulating the “Divided Line” which is expressed in some cardinal points dif-
ferently from the previous one. Asking Glaucon Socrates reformulates the
Divided Line” afresh as follows :
Are you satisfied to call the first division “	,” the second “,”
the third “	
,” and the fourth “	”―and the last two collectively
“,” and the first two “	
,” and this relation being expressed in the
proportion: as “” is to “	
,” so is “	
” to “	”; and as
“	” is to “	
,” so is “	
” to “,” and as “	
” to “,”
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so is “	” to “
” and “” to “
”?
And further he adds : ‘The relation between their objective correlates and the
division into two parts of each of these, that is, of the opinable (˜) and
the intelligible (	˜), let us dismiss, Glaucon, lest it involve us in discussion
many times as long as the preceding.’
Socrates’ abrupt stopping to go into the subdivision between the opinable
(˜) and the intelligible (	˜) suggest that the task requested for it
is rather intricate and toilsome one. Then, what kind of task is it? A clue is given
in the above context purporting that ‘as “	” to “,” so is “	” to
“
” as well as “” to “
”.’ Namely :
	:＝	:
＝:,
which may be visualized in the above diagram(Figure 4).
Why then does the proportion ‘	: ＝	: 
＝:

’ obtain? What logic is working behind it? First, we must remember the
original proportion :
(1) 	:＝	:＝
:
,
and pay attention to the fact that (1) implies that＝. Now, I do not be-
lieve that this is ‘an unintended feature of mathematical symbolism to which no
particular significance should be attached.’62) On the contrary, I think, it shows
traces of Plato’s deliberation about the relationship between the intelligible
(	) and the visible (). For the equality between  and 
clearly shows that each of them is a mean proportional between the intelligible
and the visible. When Plato had his conception of the Divided Line and the Cave,
without doubt, he deliberated among all over the role of the “intermediate” as
“a mean proportional” () which separates and connects two domains be-
tween “	” and “” at the same time. Behind the simile of Divided Line
lies a mathematical logic.
Pay attention to a fact that, in spite of Plato’s innate preference for the clear-
THE PRINCIPLE OF ISOMORPHIC PROJECTION IN……
― ―153
	  


Figure 4
cut dichotomy, the logic working behind Divided Line is not dichotomous but
trichotomous, which conforms itself to the contemporary mathematicians’ prac-
tice of “tetragonizein” (	
). The framework of Divided Line may be
legitimately regarded as a result of Euclidean Elements, VI. 17, which itself is re-
garded as a particular case of VI. 13 and VI. 16.
The proposition VI. 17 runs as follows : ‘If three straight lines be proportional,
the rectangle contained by the extremes is equal to the square on the mean; and, if the
rectangle contained by the extremes be equal to the square on the mean, the three
straight lines will be proportional.’
The first part of this proposition’s proof runs as follows : ‘Let the three
straight lines A, B, C be proportional, so that, as A is to B, so is B to C ; Let D
be made equal to B. Then, since, as A is to B, so is D to C. But, if four straight
lines be proportional, the rectangle contained by the extremes is equal to the rec-
tangle contained by the means. Therefore the rectangle AC is equal to the rec-
tangle BD.’63)
Now, it is obvious that the above proportion ‘A : B＝D : C’ exactly corresponds
to the original subdivided “Line” ‘:＝: ’ which entails ‘＝
(Figure 6).’64)
Thus, we can draw two similar rectangles which aptly exemplify the propor-
tion. Now, by consulting with the above diagram, one can readily confirm a case
that the proportional formula ‘:＝ :’ obtains ; therefore it is
also the case that ‘
: 
＝

:
.’
Now, it should be quite obvious that Plato’s initial classification underlying the
Divided Line is not dichotomous but fundamentally trichotomous. The case
could be confirmed by the visual diagram which exemplifies the “Divided Line”
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C
in the light of Elements VI. 13,65) of which Plato and Aristotle were well
informed.66)
In the above diagram (Figure 7), the line segment BD is a mean proportional
() between two unequal line segments AB and BC, therefore, as AB
() is to BD ( ), so is BD () to BC ( ).
As Aristotle aptly said,67) the same segment BD is mentioned twice ; in the first
place as “ ” and in the second place as “.”
Thus, it obtains that ‘:＝: .’
V
Now, let us go back to our initial question about the principles of isomorphic
projection (and ) and [I] reconfirm the essential properties of the two prin-
ciples and [II] define their proper ranges which are under the control of the re-
spective principles.
[I] 1. By the principle of isomorphic projection , I mean the epistemological
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Figure 7
principle by the medium of which theexercises her mathemati-
cally oriented faculties to make investigation into all things.
[I] 2. By the principle of isomorphic projection , I mean the epistemological
principle by the medium of which the 	
or 	exercises her
dialectically oriented faculties to make investigation into all things.
[I] 3. Both of these principles have in common a methodological property
which may be called “the rule of the Best explanation.”68)
[II] (A) Range of 
It is obvious that the effective range ofextends from to . Imagine
again Thales’ figure who is dealing with the measurement of the height of the
pyramid in Egypt. Observing and comparing the pyramid’s long shadow and his
own short shadow, he has now in his mind () a notion of the correlated
two similar right-angled triangles, by the medium of which he could coordinate
his own stature with the unknown height of pyramid which cannot be directly ac-
cessible. Thus, after a while, he would calculate successfully the height of the
pyramid. In this case, (1) Pyramid’s long shadow and Thales’ own short shadow
belong to the subsection ; (2) Pyramid, Thales and the geometrical diagram
on the sands belong to ; (3) the notion of two similar right-angled triangles
and a particular geometrical conclusion deduced from a particular theorem of the
similar geometrical figure belong to Thales’  .
Thus, it is necessary that the range of mathematical discipline extends from
 to  . In his Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements Proclus
explains this from the synoptic viewpoint : ‘Since mathematics occupies a middle
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position between the intelligible and the sense worlds and exhibits within itself
many likenesses of divine things and also many paradigms of physical relations,
we must observe the threefold character of demonstrations, some being more in-
tuitive, some more discursive, and some approaching the nature of opinion.
Proofs must vary with the problems handled and differentiated according to the
kinds of being concerned, since mathematics is a texture of all these strands and
adapts its discourse to the whole range of things.’69)
As we have confirmed in the previous chapters, the proper range of the 
itself is to be  . However, the scope of its activity is not limited within
 , but more extensive. Plato himself ensures the case at Republic 525c,
where referring to the distinction between “logistike” as a practical art of calcula-
tion and “arithmetike” as a number theory, he says as follows :
It is befitting, then, Glaucon, that this branch of learning should be pre-
scribed by our law and that we should induce those who are to share the
highest functions of state to enter upon that study of calculation and take
hold of it, not as amateurs, but to follow it up until they attain to the contem-
plation of the nature of number, by pure thought, not for the purpose of buy-
ing and selling, as if they were preparing to be merchants or hucksters, but
for the uses of war and for facilitating the conversion of the soul itself from
generation to essence and truth.
Though it is obvious that Plato’s point here lies in stressing the significance of
‘facilitating the conversion of the soul itself from the world of generation to es-
sence and truth,’ he nevertheless admits that the study of calculation is indispen-
sable not only for those who are preparing to be “merchants” or “hucksters” but
also for those” who are to share the highest functions of the state.” In brief,
Plato here, taking “logistike” and “arithmetike” as examples, acknowledges in a
synoptic way that the scope of the mathematical disciplines extends from to
 .70)
[II] (B) The Demarcation between and 
By the way, the above quoted passage includes an expression which may in-
duce one to face with a vexed problem of the “intermediate.” What is the refer-
THE PRINCIPLE OF ISOMORPHIC PROJECTION IN……
― ―157
ent of “the nature of numbers” (˜˜	
˜) which is grasped by
the “pure thought” (¸˜	˜¸)? By any chance does the expression refer
to the “˜˜	
˜”71) (numbers themselves) at the immediately suc-
ceeding passage? Then, what is the denotation of “˜˜	
˜”? Do
they denote the Forms of numbers or the mathematical numbers as the “inter-
mediates” between Forms and the sensible things?72) I believe, it seems to be
better to adopt the latter, since to adopt the former is to commit the twofold con-
tradictions. Let me a while investigate the context. Socrates there speaks as fol-
lows :73)
‘For you [Glaucon] are doubtless aware that experts in this study [mathe-
matics] (	˜	), if anyone attempt to cut up the ‘one’
() in argument, laugh at him and refuse to allow it ; but if you mince it
up, they [the expert mathematicians] multiply, always on guard lest the one
should appear to be not one but a multiplicity of parts (	
˜¸	).’ [...] ‘Suppose now, Glaucon,
someone were to ask them, “My good friends (˜
		), What numbers
are these you [the expert mathematician] are talking about (	
	
˜	
), in which the one is such as you postulate (	˜
	˜	˜	˜	), each of them equal to every other without the
slightest difference (	˜				),
and admitting no division into parts (	˜¸)?” What
do you think would be their answer?’ ‘This, I think―that they are speaking
of units which can only be conceived by thought, and which it is not possible
to deal with in any other way (		 ˜	
˜	
	˜ ˜	!
	).’
Needless to say, Socrates here refers to the practice of his contemporary ex-
pert mathematicians (	˜	), not to one of the dialecticians.
The fact suggests that there is no possibility here that the “one” () which
is said to be conceived only by thought denotes the Form of oneness or One it-
self, with which only dialecticians deal appropriately. I conclude that the “one”
in question does not denote the Form. The reason why is that :
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(1) The mathematicians are, according to Plato’s only dreaming about
the “one,” while in reality they cannot grasp and know it. The “dreaming”
here means, according to Plato, nothing other than the mistaking of resem-
blance for the original.74) Therefore, the “one” here must be a resemblance
of the Form of one-ness or the One itself. The “one” in question must be
intelligible, because it can be conceived only by thought. Therefore, it must
be an intelligible resemblance of the Form of one-ness or the One itself.
(2) The modification of the “one” : ‘each of them equal to every other’ (
	

˜
) strongly supports the side of “intermediate,” since the
phrase in question naturally presupposes that a lot of such individual, indi-
visible, and equal ones or units exists in the intelligible domain. But the do-
main in question cannot be the , whereat only the Forms are
permissible to reside. Therefore, the domain in question must be that of
 .
(3) Such a conception about a unit or number corresponds to Euclidean con-
ception of the unit and the number.
In the Elements VII, the definitions of the “unit” and the “number” are
given as follows :
Definition 1 : ‘A unit is that by virtue of which each of the things that
exist is called one,’
Definition 2 : ‘A number is a multitude composed of units.’
(4) In the context of such a conception of “unit” and “number,” the operation
of “addition” and “multiplication” is readily put in practice, while the “unit”
itself cannot be divided.75)
Therefore, it is obvious that Plato has in his mind in conformity with the prac-
tice of his contemporary mathematicians something like “intermediates” be-
tween the Forms and the sensible things.
[II] (B) The Problem of the. 
However, it does not always mean that Plato gave his whole-hearted sanction
to such a theory of number and recognized it as a genuine kind of knowledge
(). While he admits with reluctance its educational availability in refer-
ence to the contemplation of the first principle, in reality he finds a radical fault
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with such a theory of number. Indeed, he was fully aware of a fact that such a
theory of number is only a hypothesis (	) in its literal sense of the word
and also that only a particular group of expert mathematicians kept it in common
to themselves. Nevertheless, it seems that these expert mathematicians them-
selves, according to Socrates’ brief review of the contemporary mathematicians’
behavior at 510c, regarded their own hypotheses ‘as known (
		)’ and
took it ‘for granted that they [hypotheses] were obvious to everybody (
	

˜).’76)
The real condition of their theory of number was not beyond a set of claims
(, postulates) which demanded people’s agreement. In the beginning
of the development of Greek axiomatic and deductive mathematics, the terms
“” and “
” were interchangeable each other. Indeed, at the above
quoted passage 526a, Plato, making Socrates put a question ‘what numbers are
these you are talking about, in which the one is such as you postulate (˜),’
is referring to the very fact. His usage of the verb “˜” here corresponds to
the contemporary mathematicians’ practice and reflects some significant aspects
of it.
The “axiom” as a mathematical term is today generally understood as a propo-
sition regarded as a self-evident truth. This usage of the word axiom goes back
at least to the times of Euclid’s Elements, where the word “
” is used to de-
note a proposition whose truth cannot be doubted. However, the word “
”
is a derivative from the verb “
”(“demand,” “require,” etc.) and its original
meaning in the mathematical contexts was a “claim,” a “request,” and a “postu-
late” from the side of Mathematicians who demanded the interlocutors to accept
their first principles’ validity. However, it seems that a happening sometimes or
often took place, where the interlocutors had doubt about and refused to accept
the claim from the mathematician’ side. Then, what attitude did the mathemati-
cians take against such a situation? They assumed a firm and autistic attitude
like one with which we witnessed at the above 510c ; they regarded their claims
as known and treated them as absolute principles77) and did not deign to render
any further account of them to themselves or others, taking it for granted that
they are obvious to everybody, in spite of the obvious fact that as long as they be-
have peremptorily in such a way, there is no possibility that their claims become
the first principles which are truly obvious to everybody.78)
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[III] The Nature of Interrelationship between 	in and 
Therefore, it seems more or less to be appropriate that G. E. R. Lloyd saw in
the above mentioned context Plato’s complaint or criticism against his contempo-
rary mathematicians’ confusions.79) He said : ‘In addition to the particular com-
plaint that Plato makes concerning the failure to get back to an unhypothetical
first principle, there is a further point that he could well score against contempo-
rary mathematicians. They may well appreciate that their starting-points should
be known and should be uncontroversial ; they act as if that were the case, and
yet the actual radical disagreements among their colleagues on many questions
give them the lie. This text in the Republic would, then, be a criticism not so
much of a certainconfidence on the part of mathematicians, as of their fail-
ure to resolve, or even to come to terms with, certain foundational questions.’
Lloyd is right in so far as he saw a historical situation behind Plato’s apparently
methodological criticism against the mathematicians. In respect of such a view-
point, Ian Mueller’s following remark too does not miss the mark : ‘It is reason-
able to suppose that Plato’s description of mathematics as depending on hy-
potheses that the mathematician never attempts to justify is an accurate
description of the mathematics of his time.’80) But, they hit only a half-truth be-
hind which hides Plato’s positive intention. Referring to the contemporary ma-
thematicians’ conceptions of the hypotheses, I believe, Plato intended not only to
criticize their faults, but also to adopt their method and recast it into another
more positive one which has to be modeled after his intuition of the Good itself.
In this respect, G. Santas’ reading of the passage ‘
		
	

˜’ at 510c is also misleading, though it is interesting and provoking. Near
the conclusion of the bold and impressive paper entitled ‘The Form of the Good
in Plato’s Republic’ he insists :
What the super-science of dialectic would do for mathematics is not to pro-
vide a supergeneral known basis from which mathematical hypotheses can
be deduced, but rather to provide a theory of objects that mathematical hy-
potheses must be about if mathematics is to be knowledge. Such a theory
would ‘free’ mathematics from sensible figures in the sense that according
to it sensible figures are never evidence that the hypotheses are true or
known.’81)
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The point of the first-half lies in the criticism to the old interpretations which
have been presented by the great names like Adam,82) Cornford,83) and Ross.84)
But, this point is now so commonplace that I have but few to say about it.
However, the reader might have been much embarrassed by the second-half’s
point. What does it mean that ‘sensible figures are never evidence that the hy-
potheses are true or known’?
According to Santas, the problematic character of mathematicians’ hypotheses
arises from their ambiguous attitude towards their objects. They deal with
Forms and with visible figures at the same time.
In so far as their thought, their mathematical intuitions, derive from the visi-
ble figures, they are not assured freedom from error. [...] Plato says that
they regard their hypotheses as known and obvious to everybody and give
no account of them. What sort of being ‘known’ and ‘obviousness’ is talking
about? I think he is referring to the ‘obviousness’ of the visible figures ; it
is the visible illustrations that would make the hypotheses ‘obvious to
everyone’―precisely the things that, in Plato’s theory, could not make the
hypotheses knowledge. And what sort of ‘account’ is it that the mathemati-
cians do not give of their hypotheses? [...] I think Plato means that the
mathematicians give no epistemological account of the sorts of objects they
want their hypotheses to be about : not the visible figures but their models.
[...] They have no theory of the objects their hypotheses must (according
to Plato anyway) be about if the hypotheses are to be true and to constitute
knowledge.’85)
Given a fact that at 510c Plato makes Socrates refer to geometricians’ practice of
hypothesizing ‘the odd and the even (	

) and the vari-
ous figures (


) and three kinds of angles (˜
) and other
things akin to these in each branch of science,’ Santas’ indication to the mathe
maticians’ ambiguous attitude towards their objects may be regarded as a correct
one.
However, it is not the case. Especially, his assertion about the obviousness of
the hypotheses : ‘It is the visible illustrations that would make the hypotheses
“obvious to everyone”’ is misleading. In order to make clear the circumstances,
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let me begin with a historical fact which seemingly gives countenance to his po-
sition.
The most striking feature of Greek mathematics consists in the way of presen-
tation of proofs. It concerned not only with developing propositions consistently,
but also with providing genuine proofs for each proposition.86) In Eucledean Ele-
ments, the demonstration is often concluded with the phrase : “˜	

(what it was required to prove).” The verb “” has different meanings
which are split up into three groups, while the meaning “to show” and “to point
out” seems to be the most original one. It is noteworthy that Plato at Cratylus
430e, having this original meaning of the verb “” in his mind, wrote as
follows : ‘˜	
˜
˜


˜
’ (by “show-
ing” I understand “to put before the eyes”).87) The origin of “” as a tech-
nical term for “proof” seems to go back to the earliest times when the (Pythago-
rean) mathematicians have identified the act of proving the truth of a mathe-
matical statement with one of developing it a visible figure. O. Becker has deci-
sively showed the case. He reconstructed by the method of
88) the so-
called “doctrine of odd and even.” I pick up only two samples IX. 21 and IX. 22
here after the style of W. Burkert (Figure 9):89)
In order to convince ourselves that two propositions IX. 21 and IX. 22 are true,
we need only glance at the rows of pebbles (). As Santas said, ‘the visible
illustrations’ by pebbles () gives us immediately the two propositions’
“self-evidence.”
However, right or wrong, the reconstruction is eventually a product of imagi-
nation, which was abstracted from the context of Euclid’s Elements and not al-
ways a historical fact itself. When we turn our eyes to the text itself in Elements,
we become aware of a radically different matter of affairs. Each proposition in
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Figure 9
IX. 21 : even＋even＝even
● ● ● ●
● ● ● ●
IX. 22 : odd＋odd＝even
＋ ＝
● ● ● ● ●
● ● ● ● ●
● ● ● ● ● ●
● ● ● ● ● ●
＝
● ● ● ●
● ● ●
● ●
● ● ●
＋
● ●
● ●
Elements IX. 2134 presupposes other propositions. They are not self-evident
only by themselves. They form a systematic sequence of propositions. A propo-
sition is proved in a strictly deductive manner, presupposing the preceding
proposition. For example, IX. 23 runs as follows :90)
IX. 23 : If as many odd numbers as we please be added together, and their mul-
titude be odd, the whole will also be odd.
For let as many odd number as we please, AB, BC, CD, the multitude of
which is odd, be added together ;
I say that the whole AD is also odd.
(1) Let the unit DE be subtracted from CD ; therefore the remainder CE
is even.
(2) But CA is also even ;
(3) Therefore the whole AE is also even.
(4) And DE is a unit.
(5) Therefore AD is odd.
In the above deduction, the statement (1) is true by the medium of VII. Def.
7 (‘An odd number is that which is not divisible into two equal parts, or that
which differs by a unit from an even number.’); the statement (2) is true by the
medium of IX. 22 (‘If as many odd number as we please be added together, and
their multitude be even, the whole will be even.’); the statement (3) is true by
the medium of IX. 21 (‘If as many even numbers as we please be added together,
the whole is even.’); and the statement (4) is an assumption which presupposes
that CD as odd number is a multitude composed of units (VII. Def. 2); and finally
the statement (5) is true by the medium of VII. Def. 7 ( ‘An odd number is that
which is not divisible into two equal parts, or that which differs by a unit from an
even number.’).
All of the statements presuppose some definitions or propositions which have
been established beforehand. The proposition IX. 23 is neither visual nor self-
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Figure 10
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evident, but an abstract product deduced through a chain of rigid reasoning.
Besides, we should not overlook the fact that the above line segment AD, to our
surprise, represents no special odd number ! Indeed, each of line segments AB,
BC, CD, and AD itself is only a kind of variable for which any odd number can be
substituted. They represent no pictorial figures of odd numbers. Euclid deliber-
ately intends to avoid such a pictorial presentation. The matter becomes to be
more obvious when the proposition IX. 21 is compared with the proposition IX.
22. Both of these propositions make use of the absolutely same line segment in
order to show quite different conclusions. The Euclidean way of thinking is spe-
cifically characterized as “anti-visual oriented.”91)
Then, when has Greek mathematics been transformed into such an anti-visual
and anti-empirical one? We need not suppose that this transformation barely
happened at the time of Euclid, because, as we have mentioned in the above sec-
tion, Plato vividly reports about the figures of the contemporary mathematicians
who advocated such an anti-empirical and anti-visual arithmetic. We should re-
member his concluding remark about those mathematicians’ conception of
“units”: ‘They are speaking of units which can only be conceived by thought, and
which it is not possible to deal with in any other way (	

˜	


˜


	˜		˜

).’92) Thus,
I think, it is a safe bet that these mathematicians could not make an appeal to any
visible figure in order to persuade their interlocutors into recognizing their ab-
stract “one” as ‘obvious to everyone.’
Therefore, the passage ‘		

	˜
’ at 510c does not admit
Santas’ interpretation which appeals to the “visual”obviousness. As the proverb
‘Seeing is believing’ says, to speak about visual-obviousness of the hypotheses is
utterly nonsense, because what we see is immediately evident for us. If their hy-
potheses were visually obvious to everybody ab initio, there was no necessity for
those mathematicians to ‘claim’ (˜) the interlocutors to admit their hy-
potheses’ general acceptability.
VI
Then, why and how could those expert mathematicians claim that their hy-
potheses are ‘obvious to everybody’? I think, a clue is given in their conception
of “one” itself. Plato at Republic 525d526a explains why the expert mathe-
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maticians define their “one” as “indivisible” and says that if the one were divisi-
ble, it would no longer be one, but many. The notion of “one” itself compels
them to regard it as “indivisible,” since the supposition of “one’s divisibility” en-
tails a self-contradictory statement that ‘one is not one, but many.’ Thus, if the
idea that the unit is indivisible was accepted once, it was immediately realized
that the idea that the unit is divisible was self-contradictory.93) Hence, those ex-
pert mathematicians took it for granted that the idea that the unit is indivisible
was logically self-evident for everybody. That is, they postulated the logical obvi-
ousness (consistency) of their hypotheses.
It is necessary, however, to deliberate why the mathematicians in question
were obliged to hold such a conception of “one” which is so abstract and univer-
sal that might not readily be welcomed by peoples. Given a fact that the benefit
of an abstract notion like an algebraic symbol consists in its universal applicabil-
ity, we may conjecture that the “one” in question was a product of mathemati-
cians’ pursuing the universal applicability of their arithmetic. That is, the opera-
tion of “addition,” “subtraction,” and “multiplication” and “division” are readily
put in practice by the medium of such a conception of “unit” and “number,” even
if the concept “unit” itself had to remain to be absolutely indivisible.94) We may
also conjecture that Plato’s contemporary mathematicians presupposed that the
same condition is valid unquestionably for ‘the odd and the even and the various
figures and three kinds of angles’ etc.,95) to which Plato at 510c referred. The cir-
cumstances in question can be testified from another point of view appealing to
Euclid’ Elements, I. Postulates. There Euclid mentions to five postulates which
claim to entitle the mathematician to “draw” and “construct” figures.96)
Let the following be postulated :
1．To draw (˜) a straight line from any point (	
	
) to any point (	˜˜).
2．To produce (˜) a finite straight line continuously in a straight
line.
3．To be described () a circle with any center (
	
¸)
and distance.
4．That all right angles (
		) are equal to one an-
other.
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5．That, if a straight line falling on two straight lines make (¸˜) the in-
terior angles on the same side less than two right angles, the two
straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet (	
) on that side
on which are the angles less than the two right angles.
In conformity with these postulates, the Euclidean mathematicians are entitled
to claim the existence of innumerable “points,” “centers,” and “right angles” and
to be able to “draw” straight lines, “describe” circles and “produce” geometrical
figures as they please; the circumstances correspond precisely to that situation
where those expert mathematicians in the Republic engaged themselves in the
operation of “addition” and “multiplication” making use of their intelligible ones,
‘each of which are completely equal to every other’ (	

	˜	).
It is noteworthy that this very situation is which that Plato ridiculed and made
comment on as follows :97)
This science[geometry] is in direct contradiction with (˜		

)
the language employed in it by its experts. [...] Their language is most lu-
dicrous (
), though they cannot help it (), for they
speak as if they were doing something and as if all their words were directed
towards action. For all their talk is of “squaring” (	
	
) and
“applying” (	

) and “adding” (	) and the like, whereas
in fact the real object of the entire study is pure knowledge.
The ludicrous behaviors of the experts in geometry are, according to Socrates,
beyond their control (), since their heads face like ones of Janus in the
opposite direction simultaneously, because they occupy an intermediate position
between “that which always is” and “that which at sometime comes into being
and passes away.”98)
The circumstances naturally remind us a passage at Phaedo 96d101d, where
a full account of young Socrates’ intellectual adventure is narrated. The passage
forms a well organized plot composed of three acts : (A) Socrates’ embarrass-
ment with the contemporary practice of physical investigation of “cause ;” (B)
his disappointment and criticism to Anaxagorean type of physics which appeals
to mechanical explanation ; and (C) his final resolution to adopt the “
	

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˜” which is concluded with the theory of Forms and its application case to
the number theory. The whole passage seems to form a geometrical proportion,
a mean proportional is (B): that is, (A) : (B)＝(B) : (C). Focusing the mathe-
matical aspects and minimizing the quotation from the context, I will represent
the essence of Socrates’ argument.
(A) Socrates is embarrassed by the contemporary practice of physical investigation.
Whereas once Socrates thought that if one is added to one, then the original
one becomes two, but now he cannot admit, when one is added to one, either that
the one to which it is added has become two, or that that which is added and the
original one to which it is added have become two, simply by the addition of the
one to the other. Similarly he cannot be now convinced that the division of one
thing is the cause of the generation of two. In the former case, the cause of gen-
eration of two was the addition. In the latter case, the cause of generation of two
was the division and subtraction. These operations are contradictory to each
other. Therefore, the contemporary practice of mathematical operation is incon-
sistent and absurd.99)
What is missing here is a flash of Mind which enables one to get over this ab-
surd situation.
(B) Socrates is disappointed with the Anaxagorean type of mechanical explanation
and goes into detailed criticism of it.
Socrates heard someone reading from a book written by Anaxagoras, the pur-
port of which could be formulated as ‘Mind was what arranged everything and
caused everything.’ Socrates took the gist of the phrase to be that ‘the Mind or-
dered everything and placed each thing severally as it was best that it should be ;’
so that ‘the only thing that man needed to consider was simply what was best.’
However, contrary to his expectation, Anaxagoras in reality made no use of
Mind. In addition to this he could not differentiate between the real cause which
causes things to be in their best conditions and the mere sine qua non cause
which in reality did not deserve the name of “cause.” Socrates witnessed a fact
that most people fell in the same wrong track.100)
What is necessary here is the restoration of the Mind which deserves its true
name and which causes things to be in their best conditions.
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(C) Socrates makes his final resolution to adopt the “	
˜
 
After his failure in his study of things Socrates makes his resolution to adopt
the second best way (!"#$"%&'()&*˜') of investigation. He decides to take refuge
with )+,&-(hypotheses)101) and to study the truth of things by means of the hy-
potheses. The essence of Socrates’ new method is defined as follows :
(1) It assumes that in every investigation the most reliable or the safest hy-
pothesis should be taken as the starting-point.
(2) By “the most reliable” or “the safest” hypothesis Socrates means (2
1) a double-decked hypothesis purporting that (211) there is a Form
., and (212) all /things are /simply because of the Form of .. (2
2) For example, (221) there is a Form of the Beautiful, and (222) all
beautiful things are beautiful simply because of the Beautiful.
(3) The distinction between whether or not a statement is true is accom-
plished by the verification with the most reliable hypothesis ; (31)
whatever seems to be in accordance with this hypothesis is assumed as
a genuine one ; hence, by the same logic, (32) whatever doesn’t harmo-
nize with this hypothesis is assumed as a not-genuine one.
(4) As a corollary of (211) and (212), it is assumed that (41) there is
a Form of Two-ness (Duality), and (42) all two things are two simply
because of the Two-ness (Duality). However,
(5) the mathematicians who rely on their mathematical skills like ‘addi-
tions and divisions and all the other niceties of this sort’ assume that (5
1) when one is added to one the addition is the cause of two, or (52)
when one is separated off from one the division is the cause of two.
(6) Both of the statements (51) and (52) are not only contradictory to
each other but also do not harmonize with (4), therefore by (32) each
of them must be regarded as an absurd statement.102)
What is suggested here is a fact that the relevance between “what is the best”
and “the sine qua non” is made analogically to overlap the relationship between
“the most reliable” or “the safest hypothesis” and the mathematical hypothesis
which is produced by the “niceties of this sort.” We should not overlook that a
fundamental relationship between the “original” and its “image” (or resem-
blance) underlies these relationships, so that the following proportion obtains :
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The original (paradigm) : the image＝what is the best : the sine qua non＝the
safest hypothesis : mathematical hypothesis.103)
Now, it seems to be obvious that there is a considerable parallelism between
Phaedo 96d101d and Republic 510bc, whereat, as we have seen already,
Socrates proceeded to subdivide the intelligible section (()) and as-
sumed the following two stages in my paraphrase :
(I) There is one section ( ) where “	” (
 ) as a faculty of the
soul [e. g. one of the mathematician like Thales] is compelled to inves-
tigate the things (O) [e. g. the height of a pyramid’ and the length
of a stick planted in the ground] which are respectively regarded as the
originals (O) in relation to their images [e. g. the shadows of a
pyramid and a stick] in the former division (∪ ) by treating as
images () [e. g. supposing as the two geometrical fig-
ures which are regarded as the images of the Side of the Right-angled
Triangle itself], and by means of hypotheses ((O )) [e. g.
the theoretical construction of a proportional relation between two simi-
lar right-angled triangles] from which it proceeds not up to the first prin-
ciple (	(O)) [e. g. up to the geometrical Form like the
Triangle itself and the Side itself and also to the Good itself] but down
to a conclusion. ((O)) [e. g. down deductively to the getting
through with calculation of the height of a pyramid’.]
(II) There is another section () where the “˜” (
) as a faculty
of soul [e. g. one of a dialectician like Plato] advances from its hypothe-
ses (O ) [e. g. the theoretical construction of a proportional relation
between two similar right-angled triangles] to the first principle that
transcends hypothesis (		) (O) [e. g. heuristically
to the geometrical Form like the Triangle itself and the Side itself and
also to the Good itself], and where it makes no use of the images (O
∪O ) employed by the other section (∪), relying on
Forms (O) only and progressing systematically through Forms (O
).
The stage (I) corresponds to Phaedo 96d97b (A), and the stage (II) to
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Phaedo 99d101e (C). And the hypothesis (O ) exhibiting a knotting point
between (I) and (II) corresponds to Phaedo 97b99d (B). Thus, it seems to be
unquestionable that Plato’s conception of the interrelationship between the dia-
lectic and the mathematical discipline (including the Presocratic philosophers’
physical investigation) has been crystallized centering on the notion of “hy-
pothesis,” especially on the notion of “mathematical hypothesis.”
Behind Plato’s attack against mathematicians lies his real intention to recast
the mathematical method into his own. Thus, Plato at 511d criticizes the mathe-
maticians who ‘do not possess true intelligence about their hypotheses (˜
	

)104) and who are ‘dreaming about being (


).105) But, he does not forget to add the proviso that if they can appre-
hend their hypotheses in conjunction with the Good itself, they could recognize
these hypotheses as truly intelligible objects ().’106)
Thus, it is obvious that Plato’s concern about the distinction between dialectic
and mathematical discipline centers on the topic of necessity of a full-scale meth-
odological revolution (
)107) from a deductively oriented mechanistic sci-
ence to a heuristically oriented dialectic philosophy. The former equips itself
with a deductive logic which is exemplified by Euclidean Elements and which may
be characterized by its frequent use of the inference rule of modus ponens. The
latter equips itself with the logic of the Best explanation or a version of “abduc-
tion” which is, according to Peirce, ‘the only kind of argument which starts a new
idea’108) and therefore is a ‘heuristic’ logic which asks for the sufficient reason by
the medium of the Good itself.
Therefore, Plato’s fundamental standpoint concerning the distinction between
the dialectic and the mathematical discipline could be expressed as follows :
(2) There is a principle P1 by which the dialectic can be distinguished from
the mathematical discipline in its status quo which corresponds to the
above depicted stage (I) and is controlled by the principle .
(3) The principle is a heuristic principle which guides a dialectician and
enables him/her to grasp the Forms by the medium of establishing a
mean between the Forms which are not directly accessible and the sensi-
ble particulars.
(4) The principle acts in the framework of the theory of Forms109) as a
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principle which establishes the Paradigm (the One)-Copies (the Many)
relationship110) between the Forms and the sensible particulars and en-
ables the dialectician to turn his /her mind from the Many to the One.
The mathematical disciplines should be positively evaluated, only when they
are useful to facilitate the apprehension of the ultimate reality and the Good it-
self. Plato’s imperative in this context is this : Turn your mind from the domain
of the Many to that of the One, where dwells the most blessed part of reality and
the Good itself.111) Even if Plato apparently devoted himself to the investigation
of the mathematical problems, his greatest concern was never for the mathe-
matical problem itself, but for the ‘turning a person’s mind from the Many to the
One,’ which makes a person prepare for the discerning truths and the Good itself.
The mathematical disciplines like arithmetic, geometry and astronomy, according
to Plato, should become a significant means to emancipate the student from his
instinctive sense-bound beliefs and to facilitate to turn him from the Many to the
One.112)
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THE PRINCIPLE OF ISOMORPHIC PROJECTION
IN PLATO’S PHILOSOPHY
Hideya YAMAKAWA
In order to verify the indigenousness of Greek philosophy on the subject of the
visible () and the invisible (), I would like to focus on the two
geometrical scenes, where two distinguished Greek thinkers Thales and
Socrates make their appearances.
According to an anecdote, Thales is said to have predicted an eclipse of sun,
which really happened on May 28th, 585 B. C.; and he is said also to be the first
measurer of the height of pyramids in Egypt. On the other hand, Socrates in
Plato’s Dialogue Meno, being urged by Meno to substantiate his claim that the
learning is nothing other than the recollection (	
), tries to illustrate the
case by showing how an uneducated slave boy can recollect truths and solve a
geometrical problem, without teaching except for a series of questions.
Thus, both of these thinkers, at intervals of 200 years, gazed respectively at
their geometrical figures on the sand, in order to solve the problems with which
they confronted. Although the problems with which two distinguished thinkers
confronted were different from one another, their ways of thinking were essen-
tially isomorphic. The way of thinking they held in common might be regarded
as a version of the Best explanation or as a kind of “abduction” which C.A. Peirce
originally advocated.
The epistemological attitude which we can discern in Thales’ practical and em-
pirical achievements such as the prediction of eclipse, the measurement of dis-
tance of ships at sea, the calculation of the height of the pyramids, etc. was the
following which we may call the principle of isomorphic projection (P):
The nature of a directly inaccessible object becomes indirectly knowable,
only when a projective isomorphism as a mean between the object in ques-
tion and a directly accessible object can be detected.
国際文化論集 №29
― ―182
It is a notable fact that the principle does not only underlie, in almost universal
way, Presocratic philosophers’ way of thinking, but also underlies even the
Platonic philosophy, of course with certain significant provisos. Namely, on a
broad survey, Presocratic philosophy and Platonic philosophy may, in their funda-
mental structure, be characterized as holding in common an isomorphic struc-
ture.
